Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is generalized by showing that if the set of axioms of a theory T ⊇ PA is Σ n+1 -definable and T is Σ n -sound, then T dose not prove the sentence Σ n -Sound(T ) that expresses the Σ n -soundness of T . The optimality of the generalization is shown by presenting a Σ n+1 -definable (indeed a complete ∆ n+1 -definable) and Σ n−1 -sound theory T such that PA ⊆ T and Σ n−1 -Sound(T ) is provable in T . It is also proved that no recursively enumerable and Σ 1 -sound theory of arithmetic, even very weak theories which do not contain Robinson's Arithmetic, can prove its own Σ 1 -soundness.
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where Con(T ) is the arithmetical sentence expressing the the consistency of T (see e.g. [2, 3, 9, 10] ). This consistency statement is usually built from a "provability predicate" such as Con(T ) = df ¬Pr T ( ⊥ ), where Pr T satisfies the derivability conditions:
, and
A natural question that comes to mind is that what happens to Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for non-recursively enumerable theories? For considering the phenomenon of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for general (not necessarily recursively enumerable) theories T , we should be able to write down Con(T ) or equivalently Pr T (noting that PA ⊢ Pr T ( φ ) ↔ ¬Con(T + ¬φ) for any formula φ); thus we can only consider definable theories. Let us note that if the provability predicate of a definable theory T satisfies the derivability conditions then it can be shown that T cannot prove its consistency by the usual argument.
But if Pr T does not satisfy the derivability conditions, then Gödel's second incompleteness theorem may not hold anymore; see [6, pp. 263-264] for an example of a consistent ∆ 2 -definable extension of PA which proves its own (standard) consistency statement (Section 5 of [7] contains a more modern treatment). So, the derivability conditions may not hold for definable theories in general, even if they are sufficiently strong, e.g. contain PA, for the reason that Pr T is not then necessarily a Σ 1 -formula, so D 1 or D 3 above may not hold anymore. One of the earliest instances of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for non-recursively enumerable (but definable) theories is Jeroslow's Theorem 6 in [6, p. 264] stating (in an equivalent rewording) that ∆ 2 -definable extensions of PA cannot prove their own Σ 2 -soundness, provided that they are Σ 1 -sound (cf. [5] for the equivalence of definitions) and satisfy some further technical conditions. A theory is called Σ n -sound if it cannot prove a false Σ n -sentence. For any theory T , and any n ∈ N, the Σ n -soundness of T is equivalent to its consistency with Π n -Th(N), the set of all true Π n -sentences (see [8] for the notation). For simplicity we will write Σ n -Sound(T ) instead of Con(T ∪ Π n -Th(N)). Here we will show that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem holds for Σ n+1 -definable and Σ n -sound theories, in the sense that if T is a Σ n+1 -definable and Σ n -sound theory containing PA, then T dose not prove 2 Σ n -Sound(T ) (Theorem 4 below). This result is a bit stronger than a version which follows quickly from the well-known facts about, the so called, strong provabilty predicates (Theorem 2 below). We will also show the optimality of this result by presenting a Σ n+1 -definable (indeed complete ∆ n+1 -definable) Σ n−1 -sound extension of PA which proves its own Σ n−1 -soundness.
2 Generalized Gödel's second incompleteness theorem A theory T is definable when there exists a formula Axiom T (x) such that for every natural number n, Axiom T (n) holds just in case n is the Gödel number of an axiom of T .
The formula ConjAx T (x) indicates that x is the Gödel number of a formula which is the conjunction of some axioms of T . Let Proof(y, x) be the proof relation in first-order logic, saying that y is the Gödel code of a proof of a formula with Gödel number x. Thus, the consistency of a definable theory T , i.e., Con(T ), can be written as
So, we can write Σ n -Sound(T ) = df Con(T ∪ Π n -Th(N)) as
where the formula Π n -True(x) defines the set Π n -Th(N). We call a theory T an extension
where Axiom PA is a ∆ 0 -formula defining the set of axioms of PA. T is an explicit (or provable) extension of PA when we have
For each n ∈ N, let Pr (n+1) (x) be the provability predicate of theory T = PA + Π n -Th(N). The predicate Pr (n+1) (x) is an example of a strong provability predicate of degree n + 1 (cf. Definition 2.1 of [4] ) which means it satisfies the following conditions:
Using these properties, it can be proved that Pr (n+1) (x) satisfies the Löb axiom (The- Proof. Let φ = ⊥ in the Löb's axiom.
This result can be a bit generalized by the following observation. Let T ⊇ PA to be a Σ n+1 -definable theory which does not necessarily contain all Π n -Th(N), but it is Σ n -sound and T is also an explicit extension of PA. The Σ n -soundness of T implies that the theory
is consistent. Let Pr T * to be the provability predicate of T * . It can be easily checked that Pr T * satisfies the properties C 1 , C 2 and C 5 for a strong provability predicate of degree n + 1. By Proposition 2.11 of [1] for every σ ∈ Σ n+1 we have
, so Pr T * also satisfies the property C 3 for a strong provability predicate of degree n + 1. A close inspection of Theorem 2.2 of [4] (which proves the Löb's axiom) reveals that the property C 4 is not used in its proof, so the predicate Pr T * also satisfies the Löb's axiom which is the formalized Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. So
in T * and then in T . So we have proved the following result which is a generalization of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for definable theories, noting that for extensions of PA, Σ 0 -soundness is equivalent to consistency (Theorem 5 of [5] ); thus Gödel's second theorem is the following theorem for n = 0.
Theorem 2. For any Σ n+1 -definable and Σ n -sound theory T which is an explicit extension
We will show that this result holds even if ∀x[Axiom PA (x) → Axiom T (x)] is not necessarily provable in PA (Theorem 4 below). At first we need a few lemmas. The first one is a generalization of Craig's trick.
Lemma 1. For any n ∈ N, if a theory T is definable by a Σ n+1 formula, then it is also definable by a Π n formula.
Proof. Let the Σ n+1 formula Axiom T (x) = ∃x 1 · · · ∃x m ψ(x, x 1 , · · · , x m ) define the set of axioms of T (with ψ ∈ Π n ). This formula is logically equivalent to the formula ∃yδ(x, y) =
Let Σ n -Sound(T ′ ) be the sentence asserting the Σ n -soundness of the theory T ′ which is defined by the formula Axiom T ′ (x) as above, i.e.
Proof. 
Then for s = s ′ ∧ s ′′ , t = t ′ ∧ t ′′ and a suitable u we have
which implies ¬Σ k -Sound(T ), contradiction.
Theorem 3. For any Π n -definable and Σ n -sound theory T extending PA, we have that
Proof. Let T * = T ∪ Π n -Th(N) which is a consistent theory by the assumption of Σ nsoundness of T . By the diagonal lemma there exists a sentence γ such that PA ⊢ γ ↔ Σ n -Sound(T + ¬γ).
Firstly, we show T ⊢ γ even more T * ⊢ γ: since otherwise (if T * ⊢ γ) there would exists some s, t, u ∈ N such that ConjAx T (s) ∧ Π n -True(t) ∧ Proof( u, s ∧ t → γ ) is a true (Π n -)sentence. Since all true Π n -sentences are provable in Π n -Th(N) (and so in T * ) then we would have T * ⊢ ¬Σ n -Sound(T + ¬γ) thus T * ⊢ ¬γ, contradiction.
Secondly, we prove T * ⊢ Σ n -Sound(T + γ) → γ: note that by Proposition 2.11 of [1] for every σ ∈ Σ n+1 we have
Since ∀x(Axiom PA (x) → Axiom T (x)) is a true Π n sentence and Π n -Th(N) ⊆ T * ,
(1) together with (2) implies that
So T * ⊢ σ → ¬Σ n -Sound(T +¬σ) for any σ ∈ Σ n+1 . It suffices now to note that ¬γ ∈ Σ n+1
Thirdly, we show T * ⊢ Σ n -Sound(T ) → γ. By Lemma 3 we already have
and so by the definition of γ (T ⊢ Σ n -Sound(T + ¬γ) → γ) and the second point above
Finally, if T ⊢ Σ n -Sound(T ) then by the third point above T * ⊢ γ contradicting the first point above. For any recursively enumerable and Σ 1 -sound theory T in the language of arithmetic augmented with a symbol for exponential function (even very weak theories that dose not contain the Robinson's arithmetic), we can prove the following theorem as a corollary.
Theorem 5. If the function symbol exp (with its standard interpretation) is in the language of a recursively enumerable and Σ 1 -sound theory T , then T ⊢ Σ 1 -Sound(T ).
Proof. Let T * = T ∪ Π 1 -Th(N). By the Σ 1 -soundness of T the theory T * is consistent and contains EA (or equivalently I∆ 0 + Exp since both EA and I∆ 0 + Exp are Π 1 -axiomatizable in the presence of exp). So, Proposition 2.11 of [1] implies that
Thus, by an argument similar to the previous theorem, T * ⊢ Σ 1 -Sound(T ) which implies
3 Optimality of the Gödel's second incompleteness theorem
In this section, we construct, for any n > 0, a Σ n+1 -definable and Σ n−1 -sound theory 
Definition 1.
Fix an enumeration χ 0 , χ 1 , χ 2 , · · · of all the formulas such that (by the convention) χ 0 = Con(T 0 ), where T 0 = PA ∪ Π n−1 -Th(N). We construct T by recursions.
We will show that T is the desired theory in four steps.
Lemma 4. Let T be defined as above, then
(1) T is consistent and Σ n−1 -sound;
Proof. (1) is trivial, and so we just prove (2). Let Con T 0 (x) be defined as
and put Compl (y), meaning that y is a (partial) completion of T 0 , be the formula
Then the theory T is definable by the following Σ n+1 -formula
where
Proof. Reason inside PA + Σ n−1 -Sound (PA) = PA + Con(T 0 ). The existence of y will be proved by induction on z.
• For z = 0, put y = χ 0 if Con T 0 ( χ 0 ) and y = ¬χ 0 if ¬Con T 0 ( χ 0 ); note that by Lemma 3 we have Con T 0 ( ¬χ 0 ) in the latter case.
•
and 
The uniqueness of y will again be proved by induction on z.
• For z = 0, if for some y and y ′ we have Compl (y) ∧ [y] ℓ(y)−1 ∈ { χ 0 , ¬χ 0 } and
in both cases; contradictions.
• For z + 1 assume that both
holds, and so by the induction
, and then, just like before,
should hold in both cases; contradiction with y ⇂ (z + 1)=y ′ ⇂ (z + 1).
Proof. Reason inside PA + Σ n−1 -Sound (PA) = PA + Con(T 0 ). Take ψ 0 , · · · , ψ l to be any sequence of the axioms of T 0 and ϑ 0 , · · · , ϑ k to be any sequence of formulas for which
Proof (u, i k ϑ i ∧ j l ψ j → ⊥ ) can hold for no u. Now, since any sequence of the axioms of T can be rearranged as ψ 0 , · · · , ψ l , ϑ 0 , · · · , ϑ k where ψ j 's and ϑ i 's are as above,
Con(T) holds.
Therefore, PA + Σ n−1 -Sound (PA) ⊢ Con(T), and then our conclusion follows from the fact that Σ n−1 -Sound (T) = df Con(T + Π n−1 -Th(N)) = Con(T) since T + Π n−1 -Th(N) = T.
Theorem 6. For any n ≥ 1, there exists a ∆ n+1 -definable and Σ n−1 -sound theory T which proves self Σ n−1 -soundness: T ⊢ Σ n−1 -Sound (T).
Proof. The theory T constructed above is Σ n+1 -definable, and since it is complete, it must be Π n+1 -definable as well. To see it more directly, note that for all j ∈ N χ j ∈ T ⇐⇒ N Axiom T 0 ( χ j ) ∨ ∀y(Compl (y) ∧ j < ℓ(y) → χ j =[y] j ).
Since χ 0 = Con(T 0 ) is consistent with T 0 (i.e. N Con T 0 ( χ 0 )), then χ 0 = Con(T 0 ) ∈ T 1 , and so T ⊢ Con(T 0 ). Therefore, noting that Σ n−1 -Sound (PA) = df Con(PA+Π n−1 -Th(N)) = Con(T 0 ) and PA ⊆ T, Lemma 6 implies that T ⊢ Σ n−1 -Sound (T).
Concluding Remarks
A special case of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for Σ n -soundness of PA follows from the well-known facts on strong provability predicates and their modal logics (see e.g. [1, 4] ) and it could be extended to Σ n -definable and explicit (provable) extensions of PA.
So, no Σ n -definable, Σ n−1 -sound and explicit extension of PA can prove its own Σ n−1 -soundness (Theorem 2-which generalizes Theorem 6 of [6] ). We strengthened this result by deleting the requirement of "explicit extension of PA" (Theorem 3). The optimality of this result, in a sense, follows from the fact that a complete ∆ n+1 -definable and Σ n−1 -sound theory (which is an explicit extension of PA) may prove its own Σ n−1 -soundness (Theorem 6-which generalizes an example of [6] reconstructed in [7] ).
